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We provide new evidence about a positive correlation between the own amount sent 
and  the  own  amount  returned  in  the  investment  game.  Our  analysis  relies  on 
experimental  data  collected  under  the  strategy  method  for  establishing  our  main 
result. While the percentage returned is independent of the amount received for most 
of our subjects, it is strongly correlated to their amount sent as a trustor. Our analysis 
is based on a two-way classification of subjects : according to their trusting type and 
according  to  their  reciprocal  type.  We  show  the  existence  of  a  strong  correlation 
between trusting types and reciprocal types within subjects.  
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1.  Introduction 
Why do senders and receivers choose positive amounts in the investment game ? A variety of 
explanations has been provided to account for such behaviours. On the sender‟s side, other-
regarding preferences (Cox, 2004, Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000), expectations about positive 
reciprocity (Rotter, 1980, Gambetta, 1988, Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994, Hardin, 2002, Ashraf 
et al., 2006, Bellemare and Kroeger, 2007), risk-attitudes (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004, Sapienza 
et al., 2008, Naef & Schupp, 2009), unconditional giving (e.g. Kantian categorical imperative), 
warm glow of giving (Andreoni, 1990), have been suggested as possible  motives for sending 
positive  amounts.  On  the  receiver‟s  side,  some  of  these  motives  account  also  for  returning 
positive  amounts,  e.g.  warm  glow  and  other-regarding  preferences.  But  there  are  additional 
reasons, for instance reciprocity and inequality aversion. Although trust and reciprocity are not 
the  only  motives  for  sending  and  returning  positive  amounts  in  the  investment  game,  for 
expository reasons we shall abuse terminology and identify the sender as the trustor and the 
receiver as the trustee. 
Isolating the motives for sending and returning in the investment game remains a difficult task, 
since these motives possibly interact within individuals.  To take a step forward our aim is to  
investigate the extent to which some of these factors are related to each other. Our hypothesis is 
that trust attitudes and reciprocity attitudes are strongly correlated within individuals. A trustful 
person  trusts  strangers  because  he  himself  is  a  reciprocal  person.  In  this  paper  we  provide 
evidence  that  trust  and  reciprocity  attitudes  are  correlated  within  individuals.  Based  on 
experimental data of a one-shot investment game, we show that more trustful subjects are also 
more trustworthy, and vice-versa. To show this we categorize individuals according to their level 
of trustworthiness which we measure as the percentage returned in the investment game. Then 
we show that in each category the conditional trustworthiness follows a uniform distribution 
across amounts sent.  
Our experiment is based on the strategy method to collect individual data for both roles. As a 
trustor, each subject had to decide about the number of units of his endowment that he wants to 
send to an anonymous counterpart. As a trustee, each subject had to decide how many units he 
wanted to return to an anonymous counterpart, for each possible amount that he could possibly 
receive. Our main findings can be summarized as follows : i) the percentage returned is uniform 
across received amounts for a vast majority of subjects, ii) the percentage returned is positively 
correlated with the own amount sent, and iii) subjects identified as higher trusting types are also 
identified as higher reciprocal types.    3 
In section 2 we provide a critical overview of previous investigations of the relation between 
trustfulness and trustworthiness. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Sections 4, 5 and 6  
present our results. Section 7 is our conclusion. 
 
2.  Litterature review 
Various  methodologies  have  been  used  to  investigate  the  relation  between  trustfulness  and 
trustworthiness,  by  looking  at  a  possible  correlation  between  :  i)  the  amount  sent  and  the 
percentage returned, ii) trustworthiness  and answers to trust-related attitudinal questions
1, iii)  
beliefs about trustworthiness and trustfulness, and iv) own trustfulness and own  trustworthiness. 
We briefly review each of these attempts to identify a  possible relation between trustfulness and 
trustworthiness, to discuss their limitations.  
There is mixed evidence about a positive correlation between the amount sent and the amount 
returned in the investment game. In their seminal paper, Berg et al. (1995) found no correlation 
between these decisions. This finding was replicated in laboratory experiments (e.g. Willinger et 
al., 2003, Csukas et al., 2008), in field experiments (Barr, 2003) and in other  trust-related 
experiments, such as  the “lost wallet game” (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000) or the gift exchange 
game (van der Heijden et al., 2001). But other experiments based on different versions of the 
investment game, found a positive relation between the amount sent by the trustor and the 
amount returned by the trustee : Güth et al. (2000), Glaeser et al. (2000), Bellemare & Kroeger 
(2007), Schotter and Sopher (2006), Chaudhuri  &  Gangadharan  (2007),  Ashraf et  al.  (2006), 
Greig & Bohnet (2008), and Bornhorst et al. (2009). Based of this mixed evidence about the 
correlation  between  the  amount  sent  and  the  percentage  returned,  one  cannot  give  a  clear 
conclusion about the existence of a relation between trustfulness and trustworthiness. Since many 
reasons can lead the trustor to send and the trustee to return, even in cases where a positive 
correlation is well established, it is difficult to conclude that it is because of trustfulness and 
trustworthiness.  
Answers  to  attitudinal  questions  can  provide  additional  insights  about  the  relation  between 
trustfulness and trustworthiness. Although stated trust does not necessarily reflect genuine trust, 
                                                 
1 The standard trust question of the General Society Survey (GSS) and European Social Survey (ESS round 4) is phrased as 
follows : „„Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can‟t be too careful in dealing with 
people?‟‟. The percentage of „yes” answers is taken as a crude measure of trusfulness in the studied sample (in more recdent 
versions respondents are asked to provide a rating between 0 and 10). Two additional questions are used to measure social 
confidence :  „Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to 
be fair?”, and “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful1 or that  they  are  mostly  looking  out  for 
themselves?”, and respondents are asked to provide a rating between 0 and 10. 4 
answers to survey questions have been combined with experimental data. Glaeser et al. (2000) 
were the first to establish that attitudinal variables are only loosely related - or unrelated - to 
experimentally measured trust, a finding that was confirmed by Gaechter et al. (2004), Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2005), Ermisch et al. (2007), Holm & Nystedt (2008) and Csukas et al. (2008). On 
the  other  hand,  Glaeser  et  al.  (2000)  showed  that  there  is  a  strong  correlation  between 
experimentally measured trustworthiness and several trust-related answers to standard attitudinal 
questions,  confirmed  by  Karlan‟s  (2005)  study.  Similarly,  Csukas  et  al.  (2008)  found  that 
responders who answer „yes‟ to the GSS trust question return on average a 9% significantly 
higher share of the received amount
2. Glaeser et al. (2000) suggested “that the standard trust 
questions  may  be  picking  up  trustworthiness  rather  than  trust”.  However,  other  studies 
combining survey and experimental data lead to a different conclusion. Fehr et al. (2003) found 
exactly the opposite result than Glaeser et al. (2000) : their survey measures of  trust (direct 
questions  about  trust  in  strangers  and questions  about past trusting behaviour) correlate with 
trusting  behaviour in  their experiment
3 but are bad predictors of trustworthiness. The sharp 
contrast between these findings can be attributed to sample selection. While Glaeser et al. (2000) 
relied on a student sample (Harvard undergraduates), Fehr et al.‟s (2003) study was based on a 
representative population sample. Sample effects were highlighted in other studies, such as Holm 
&  Danielson  (2005)  who  found  that  stated  trust  and  trust  behaviour  are  correlated  in  their 
Swedish sample but not in their Tanzanian sample (see also Sapienza et al., 2007). Likewise to the 
correlation between the amount sent and returned, there is mixed evidence about a correlation 
between trust behaviour and stated trust. The way the standard trust question is framed might 
actually measure something different than trust, and the amount sent in the investment game is 
potentially grounded on a combination of several motives. What exactly is measured in surveys 
and  in  experiments  on  trust  remains  however  unclear.  A  slight  change  in  either  the  survey 
measure of trust, or the experimental protocol
4, may therefore lead to a different conclusion 
about the correlation between stated trust and experimentally measured trust (see  Naef  & 
Schupp, 2009).   
In view of the above conclusions, within-subject experiments provide a more straightforward test 
for establishing a correlation between trustfulness and trustworthiness. Several studies allowed 
each subject to play both roles, either by  direct observation of subjects‟ choices of by relying on 
                                                 
2  Gaechter  et  al.  (2004)  provided  evidence  that  beliefs  about  others‟  trustworthiness  is  correlated  with  their 
cooperative behaviour in a voluntary contribution game to a public good.  
3 See also Naef & Schupp (2009) 
4  For instance  Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005)  showed that increasing the stakes in the investment reduces 
significantly the proporition of the endowment sent by the trustor.  5 
the strategy method : Glaeser et al. (2000), Ashraf et al. (2006), Chaudhuri & Gangadharan (2007) 
and  Altmann  et  al.  (2008).  Glaeser  et  al.  (2000)  found  that  the  own  amount  sent  has  a 
significantly positive but small effect, on the own percentage returned. Ashraf et al. (2006) found 
that own expectations about trustworthiness play a key role for the trustor‟s decision to trust. 
They included many variables (e.g. demographic, attitudinal, ....) in their regression analysis, but 
found that the only significant variables affecting positively the amount sent by the trustor are his 
expectation about the amount returned by the trustee and by his “unconditional kindness” (i.e. 
his amount sent) while risk-aversion and answers to the trust-question have no effect on trust. 
The trustee‟s decision to return depends crucially on his unconditional kindness and his attitude 
towards  the  trust-question.  In  an  experiment  using  the  strategy  method,  Chaudhuri  & 
Gangadharan (2007) found that the more trustworthy subjects are also the more trusting ones. 
Trusting subjects (defined as those who send at least 50% of their endowment) are not more 
reciprocal than non-trusting subjects (those who send less than 50% of their endowment), but 
trustworthy  subjects  (those  who  return  at  least  1/3)  are  clearly  more  trusting  than  the 
untrustworthy ones (those who return less than 1/3). Their findings suggest that trustworthiness 
implies  trustfulness  while  the  opposite  is  not  true
5. Finally Altmann et al. (2008) elicited 
trustfulness and trustworthiness also by using the strategy method. For each subject they regress 
the amount sent back as a trustee on the possible amounts received by the trustor
6. The 
regression coefficient (r) is used to classify subjects : “reciprocal” subjects are defined as those for 
which  r  >  1  and  “selfish”  ones  by  r  =  0  (the  remaining  category,  0  <  r  ≤  1,  is  called 
“intermediary”). They show that the more reciprocal subjects are those who are the most trustful. 
While these findings suggest that trust and reciprocity attitudes are correlated within individuals, a 
more careful analysis is needed in order to understand how the level of trust is linked to the level 
of reciprocity within individuals.  
 
3.  Experimental design 
The experiment was run at the University of Miskolc (Hungary) in December 2003, and involved 
74 participants. 4 sessions, involving 9-10 subject-pairs each, were organized. All subjects were 
university students and were recruited through various means: advertisements through mailing 
lists, posters, loud voice advertisements in classes. 
                                                 
5 Barr (2003) found a positive relation between the amount sent (s) by the trustor and the percentage returned by the 
trustee (r/s) : an increase in r/s leads to an increase in s (while r/s is independent of s in the regression of r/s with 
respect to s). 
6 They rely on OLS and force the constant to be zero. 6 
Upon arriving at the experimental lab, subjects were assigned randomly either to room I or to 
room II. To implement the investment game, we used a triple-blind procedure, slightly different 
from the one used by Berg & al. (1995). Participants received a detailed instructions sheet which 
they  were  asked  to  read  privately.  After  self-reading  the  experimenter  read  out  loudly  the 
instructions to implement common knowledge of the game. Eventual questions were answered 
privately. 
Each participant received an endowment of 10 virtual Euros at the beginning of the experiment. 
Earnings  accumulated  during  the  experiment  were  added  to  the  residual  endowment,  and 
converted into Hungarian Forint at the rate of 160 HUF/€. 
We used the strategy method to collect individual data for both roles: sender and receiver. As a 
sender subjects had to decide how much (S) of their initial Euros they wanted to transfer to an 
anonymous receiver. Only integer amounts between 0 and 10 could be submitted. Sent amounts 
were tripled by the experimenter before being transferred to the receiver who earned 3S. Then 
the receiver could decide how much of his received amount he wanted to return (R) to the 
sender. In the instructions the sender was called “player A” and the receiver “player B”. 
The questionnaire was split into two parts. In part 1 (sender role) all participants had to decide 
how much Euros (if any) they wanted to transfer to the receiver. In part 2 (receiver role) they 
were asked how much they wanted to return for any possible received amount. 
Participants were told that their actual role in the experiment would be decided randomly, only 
after they had answered the two parts of the questionnaire. After collecting part 2 questionnaires, 
the experimenter chose randomly the subjects‟ role and informed each subject about his player 
type: all subjects in one room were assigned to role A and all players in the other room were 
assigned to role B. Since the number of participants was equal in the two rooms this procedure 
guaranteed that the number of A players was equal to the number of B players. Each A player 
was randomly matched with a B player. For each randomly formed player pair the experimenter 
matched  their  decisions  by  taking  into  account  the  decision  of  player  A  in  part  1  and  the 
corresponding decision of player B in part 2. This matching determined the final payoff of each 
player, as explained above.
7 
                                                 
7 The experiment started with 74 participants, who were equally split between room I and II, which means 37 
subjects in each room. However during the experiment one participant stopped reading and filling the questionnaires 
and left the room. Since we had odd number of participants, one randomly selected B player was actually matched 
with two A players in order to determine the final payoff of the remaining A player. The selected player B received 
his payoff according to the decision of the first player A. This had not influence on our data, although it affected the 
final payoff of one of the A players. 7 
Before all participants were paid off they were asked to fill out a final questionnaire about their 
demographic data (gender, age, academic major, academic year, pocket money and whether they 
lived or not with their parents). 
The final payoffs were calculated as follows: for the sender, the final payoff was equal to (10 – S 
+ R) and for the receiver (10 + 3S – R), where S is the amount sent and R the amount returned.  
 
4.  Sent and returned amounts 
4.1.  Sent amounts 
In this sub-section we report the amounts sent according to various demographic variables that 
were observed in our final questionnaire. Our aim is to ascertain that our data is not at odds with 
the typical findings of the literature about the investment game. 
The average sent amount is 5.10 Euro from the possible maximum of 10 Euro, which is not 
significantly different (two-tailed t-tests, 5% significance level ) from the average amount sent in 
the BDMc no-history treatment (5.16$) or from the average sending of the Hungarian subsample 
in  the  intercultural  experiment  of  Csukás  &  al.  (2008)  (5.68  Euro).  Table  1  (see  appendix) 
provides summary results for the amount sent according to demographic variables.  
On average males send 1.4 Euro more than females, a significant difference (ANOVA-test p = 
0.035, and Mann-Whitney one-sided-test p = 0.0375). For other grouping variables the average 
sent amounts are not significantly different : neither age, academic year, major, pocket money and 
living circumstances (with or without parents) cause any significant difference in the amount sent 




grouping variable F-statistics p
gender 4.605 0.035
age 2.595 0.112
academic year 2.461 0.121
academic major 1.525 0.221
pocket money 0.540 0.465
live with parents 0.131 0.718  
Table 2: ANOVA-tests for demographic variables 8 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of sent amounts, which is bimodal in accordance with 
other experiments. For example, in the data of Berg & al. (1995), Willinger & al. (2003) and 
Csukás & al. (2008), typical sent amounts range between 2 and 6, and show a spike at 10. These 
amounts – between 2 and 6 or 10 – are chosen by 82% of the participants (60 out of 73). While 
the standard predicted amount - sending nothing - was observed only once, the other extreme the 
socially optimum level (i.e. 10) - was observed for 15% of the participants.  
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of sent amounts 
A regression for which the sent amount is the dependent variable
8 (see table 3) confirms the 
results of the ANOVA test about the gender effect: males  (coded 1)send on average 1.37 Euro 
more to their counterparts than females, a significant difference (p=0.029). Besides gender, the 
academic year (coded from 1 to 5 as in  table 1) turns out also to be significant in the regression 
analysis (see table 3)
9. 
Independent variables  Coefficients 
Constant  2.57* 
Gender  1.37* 
(2.22) 
Academic year  0.68** 
(3.23) 
s  2.56 
R
2  18.3% 
       * significant at 5% level,   (t-values) 
                                                 
8 A multivariate linear regression was fitted by the method of least-squares and backward elimination (all insignificant 
independent variables were eliminated until we reached this last regression in which all variables were significant (i.e. 
gender and academic year). 
9 Note, that in table 1 average sending according to academic year show monotone increase (students of 5 th year sent 
almost double than 1st year students) which variable just slightly fails to be significant (with a p-value of 0.12) by 
ANOVA test, mainly because of the low number of observations in different academic year categories. 
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       ** significant at 1% level,   (t-values) 
Table 3: Significant explanatory variables for sent amount 
4.2. Relation between sent and returned amounts 
In this subsection we provide a preliminary statement of our main result that we detail in the next 
section  :  the  relation  within  individuals  between  the  own  level  of  trust  (sent  amount)  and 
trustworthiness  (returned  percentage).  To  start  with,  we  investigate  the  following  simple 
regression :  
ri =  + Si + Ti + i , 
where ri is the percentage returned by the second mover, Si is the amount sent by the first mover 
in subject pair i and Ti is the amount that the responder would have sent as a first mover, which 
we interpret as the responder‟s own level of trust. 
Since all participants acted as senders in the first part of the experiment, and as responders in the 
second part of the experiment, we are able to compare all subjects‟ level of reciprocity (returned 
percentage in all possible cases) to their own level of trust (sent amount as player A). The sample 
consists of 67 participants: we therefore collected 67 independent observations for sent amount, 
67×10 observations
10 for returned amounts. 
Independent variables  Coefficients 
Constant  0.255** 
Sent (Si)  -0.001 
(-0.39) 
Own trust (Ti)  0.030** 
(11.06) 
s  0.191 
R
2  15.5% 
       ** significant at 1% level,   (t-values) 
Table 4: Regression coefficients of returned percentage (R%i) 
Table 4 summarizes the regression coefficients and their significance. While ß does not differ 
significantly  from  zero,    is  highly  significant  (at  0.1%)  which  supports  the  hypothesis  that 
returned percentages depend strongly on the own level of trust of the responder. 
However the 670 observations are not independent, since each participant provided a vector of 
10  returned  amounts.  We  therefore  run  a  new  regression  by  taking  the  average  returned 
                                                 
10 Note, that total number of participants was 73, but six observations had to be excluded, since these six participants 
failed to answer entirely the questionnaire as player B. 10 
percentage of the second mover (m(ri)) as the dependent variable, with a reduced sample of only 
67 independent observations: 
m(ri) =  + Ti + i , 
The results are reported in table 5. Although taking averages reduces sharply the number of data 
points, we find that the value of  is unchanged and is significantly larger than zero (p < 0.01). 
Furthermore  the  elimination  of  the  variable  Si  (sent  amount)  from  the  regression  increases 
significantly the explanatory power (R
2 increases from 15.5% to 19.2%) although the number of 
observations is divided by 10. Note, that the constant is also significant (t-value = 5.76). 
The value of the constant may be interpreted as the average percentage returned by a responder 
who  sends  nothing  to  her  counterpart,  i.e.  the  unconditional  return.  In  our  sample  this 
percentage  (one-quarter  of  the  received  amount)  is  slightly  lower  than  in  other  studies.  For 
instance, Cox (2002) found that the average returned percentage does not significantly differ 
from one-third of the received amount. This percentage is typically returned partly based on 
altruism and partly on reciprocal behaviour and ensures that the first mover is compensated for 
his investment effort. 
Independent variables  Coefficients 
Constant  0.249** 
Own trust (Ti)  0.030** 
(3.93) 
s  0.17 
R
2  19.2% 
       ** significant at 1% level,   (t-values) 
Table 5: Significant regression coefficient of average returned percentage (Mean(R%i)) 
The significance of the coefficient  supports our conjecture about the role of the own level of 
trust on the percentage returned : acting as a first mover, every Euro increase in the sent amount 
increases the returned percentage by 3%. Therefore, a first mover with the highest level of trust is 
willing to return on average 55% of the received amount when acting as a responder, i.e. subjects 
who exhibit the maximum level of trust, return about half of the amount received. 
One can still argue against the use of average returned percentages, since the substitution of the 
original  10  returned  percentages  by  their  mean  for  each  responder  can  easily  lead  to  poor 
explanatory power from the data. This is true except if the 10 substituted returned percentages 
are not significantly different from each other and thus from their average. In other words, if the 
returned percentages of a given responder follow uniform distribution then these values do not 11 
deviate significantly from their mean and can therefore be safely substituted by their mean value. 
We show in the next section that the hypothesis of uniform distribution of returned amount is 
satisfied for most of our subjects.  
5.  Uniform distribution of returned percentages 
5.1 Average returned percentages and reciprocal types 
We start by looking at the average returned percentage as a function of the received amount for 
the whole sample. Figure 2 shows the average returned percentage for each possible received 
amount. The null hypothesis of uniform distribution cannot be rejected (p < 0.01). The vertical 
bars  show    1  standard  deviation  from  the  average  returned  percentages,  indicating  a 
considerable variance of returned amounts. However, the hypothesis of equal standard deviations 
across received amount cannot be rejected (p < 0.05). 
Figure 2: Average returned percentages per amount received and standard deviations  
At the individual level, the null-hypothesis of uniform distribution of returned percentages is 
accepted for 43 subjects out of 67 (
2-test, 5% significance level) : for 64.2% of the responders 
the returned percentage is independent of the received amount. However, not all of the subjects 
follow such a uniform pattern. We therefore classify each subject into one of the four types of 
behavioural patterns according to the general shape of their returned percentage (see figure 9 in 
the appendix) : 
Uniform type : the percentage returned is independent of the amount received; 
Increasing type : the percentage returned increases with the amount received; 
Decreasing type : the percentage returned decreases with the amount received; 
Random type : the percentage returned does not exhibit any clear pattern. 12 
Table 6 shows the frequency of each type. Obviously the uniform and the random types are the 
most frequent patterns of behaviour in our data.  
Type  Frequency  Proportion (%) 
Uniform  43  64.2 
Increasing  2  3.0 
Decreasing  6  9.0 
Random  16  23.8 
Total  67  100.0 
Table 6: Subjects‟ types according to the distribution of returned percentages 
Figure 3 shows the average returned percentages for each type. The pattern for the random type 
looks very similar to the one of the uniform type. If we neglect the lowest received amount (3 ), 
the hypothesis of uniform distribution of returned amount cannot be rejected for the random 
type ( 5% level).  
 
Figure 3: Average returned percentages per subject-type 
5.2 Average returned percentages and own level of trust 
In  figure  4  we  report  the  frequency  distribution  of  sent  amounts  and  the  average  returned 
percentages of responders belonging to each sent amount category. The horizontal axis indicates 
the amount sent by subjects in player A‟s role. The left axis measures the frequency of subjects 
who  send  the  corresponding  amount,  and  the  right  axis  measures  their  average  returned 
percentage.  The  continuous  line  indicates  the  average  percentage  returned  (for  all  possible 
received amounts) for each sent amount category. For example, for the sent amount 1 (horizontal 
axis), the frequency is equal to 3 subjects (left vertical axis), and their average returned amount is 
equal to 20.7% (right vertical axis).   13 
 
Figure 4: Average returned percentages as function of own level of trust 
In accordance with our previous findings figure 4 shows an increase of the average returned 
percentage with the level of the amount sent by the responder. The average returned percentage 
increases sharply between trust levels 3 and 4 and between trust levels 7 and 8. We tentatively 
group our subjects into 3 categories according to their own level of trust : low (0-3 Euros), medium 
(4-7 Euros), and high (8-10 Euros). In figure 4, these groups are separated by vertical broken lines. 
For  the  low  trust  category  the  average  returned  percentage  is  less  than  33%,  while  for  the 
medium trust category it varies between 39 and 47%, and for the high trust category it varies 
between 53-64% (see table 7). 
Sent amount (as trustor)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
frequency  1  3  9  10  14  11  5  4  3  2  11 
average returned%  28.7  20.7  32.4  30.7  39.7  41.0  41.4  46.6  63.3  53.0  52.3 
st.dev. of average ret.%  0  0.9  17.9  19.0  15.8  13.0  7.8  19.1  20.5  18.5  27.5 
Table 7: Average returned percentages as function of own level of trust 
 
Inspection of figure 4 and table 7, suggests the  two following refined hypotheses about the 
relation between the own level of trust and the own returned percentage : in each trust category 
(low, medium, high) the level of reciprocity is 1) independent of the amount received, and 2) 
determined by the own level of trust of the subjects. We state these observations as hypotheses 
to be tested: according to hypothesis 1 the three curves of average returned percentages are quasi 
parallel (see figure 5), and according to hypothesis 2 the differences between the three curves are 



















low trust  medium trust  high trust 14 
point-wise significant. In order to test for point-wise difference between any two distribution 
curves, we rely on two sample t-tests for pairwise comparisons. 
Hypothesis 1: The average returned percentage follows a uniform distribution across received 
amounts in each trust category (low, medium and high). 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of average returned percentages according to trust level categories 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of average returned percentages for each received amount and 
for each trust category (low, medium and high). Figures 6, 7 and 8 (see appendix) provide details 
about standard deviations. 
We  rely  on  the  
2-statistic  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  returned  percentages  follow 
uniform distribution in each trust level category. Table 8 reports the average returned percentages 
for each category and for all possible received amounts. The two right-most columns report the 
calculated 
2 and the critical values. Comparing the calculated values to the critical values we 
conclude  that  in  all  trust  level  categories  the  hypothesis  of  uniform  distribution  cannot  be 
rejected, which means that the level of reciprocity
11 is independent of the received amount. 
                                                 
11 To control for this statement we also run a 2-test to check whether the difference between two trust categories of 
average returned percentages follow uniform distribution. The pairwise difference of average returned percentage is 
independent from the level of received amounts. This fact can also be observed visually on figure 5. 15 
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
low 34.8% 36.4% 34.3% 31.1% 29.7% 28.0% 27.9% 26.3% 25.4% 25.5% 4.92 16.92
medium 31.3% 40.9% 43.1% 44.9% 42.8% 42.6% 41.1% 41.4% 41.8% 42.2% 2.95 16.92
high 52.8% 52.8% 51.9% 53.5% 53.9% 56.0% 55.6% 55.2% 55.2% 55.3% 0.34 16.92
Received amounts trust level 2 Cr. value
T
able 8: Average returned percentages for different trust level categories for all possible received 
amounts and 
2-tests of uniform distribution 
Since the hypothesis of uniform distribution cannot be rejected, we can test for the pairwise 
differences between returned percentages.  
Hypothesis  2:  Returned  percentages  are  larger  for  higher  trust  categories  for  each  received 
amount  
Table 9 reports the results of a two-sample one-tailed t-test (5%) for pairwise differences of 
average returned percentages between trust level categories
12. In the upper part  of table 9  the 
comparison of medium and low trust categories are presented. The H1 hypothesis states that for 
a given received amount the average returned percentage is larger for the medium trust category 
than for the low trust category. In the lower part of table 9 the equivalent comparison is made for 
the high and medium trust categories : the H1 hypothesis states that for a given received amount 
the average returned percentage is larger for the high trust category  than for the medium trust 
category. 
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
H1: m(medium)>m(low) -3.5% 4.5% 8.8% 13.9% 13.1% 14.6% 13.2% 15.1% 16.3% 16.8%
p-value 0.771 0.188 0.025 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001
H1: m(high)>m(medium) 21.5% 11.9% 8.8% 8.5% 11.1% 13.4% 14.4% 13.8% 13.5% 13.1%




ble 9: Pairwise comparison of average returned percentages between trust level categories 
The H1 row reports the pairwise differences of returned average percentages for each possible 
received  amount.  The  next  row  shows  the  p-values  for  these  differences.  Bold  characters 
correspond to cases where the H1 hypothesis is accepted at the 5% level. In 15 cases out of 20. 
subjects  in  the  higher  trust  category  return  a  significantly  larger  percentage  of  the  received 
amount than subjects in the lower trust category. 
                                                 
12 The precondition for these t-tests in case of small samples is equality of variances. The F-statistics reveals no 
significant differences ( 5% level) between each pair of the categories. The equality of standard deviations can also be 
visually observed on figures 6, 7 and 8 in the appendix. 16 
Comparing the average returned percentage of the low and the medium trust categories (upper 
part of table 9) only two differences are insignificant, the ones that correspond to the two lowest 
amounts, 3 and 6 Euro (see figure 5). In the first case medium trust subjects return even less than 
low trust subjects. If the received amount is 9 Euro the medium trust subjects return on average 
8.8%  more,  a  significant  difference.  When  the  received  amount  is  larger  than  9  Euro  the 
difference varies between 13.1% and 16.8%, a highly significant difference (less than 1%) as can 
be inferred from figure 5. 
Comparing the average returned percentage for medium and high trust categories, there are three 
insignificant differences : for received amounts equal to 9, 12 and 15 Euros. For all the other 
received amounts the differences are significant at the 5% level, and below the 1% level in a few 
cases. 
If we impose the less stringent significance level of 10%, only three of the differences turn out to 
be insignificant : the first two cases (returning from 3 and 6 Euro) between low and medium trust 
level categories
13 and the case of 12 Euro received amount between medium and high trust level 
categories. Anyway, in 75% of the cases the difference between the average returned percentages 
are significant at the 5% level, and in 50% of the cases the differences are signific ant at the 1% 
level. 
Finally, we also carried out a one -sided Mann-Whitney test to compare the average returned 
percentages in different trust level categories
14. All the differences are significant at the 5% level. 
Since hypotheses 1 and 2 cannot be rejected, we conclude that the average returned percentage is 
independent from the received amount. The observed difference between the quasi -parallel 
curves of average returned amounts (see figure 5) can be attributed to differences in own trust 
levels of responders. These findings are in line with the result of our regression analysis. Taken 
together, both analyses support the hypothesis that trusting behaviour and trustworthiness are 
strongly correlated within individuals.  
6.  Relation between trust types and reciprocity types 
A final question is whether there is any relation between trusting types (low, medium and high) 
and reciprocity types (uniform, increasing, decreasing and random). Table 10 shows the subjects‟ 
                                                 
13 It can also be viewed on figure 5 where the curves of the two lowest trust level categories cross each other. 
14 For each category we calculate the average returned percentage for each subject (i.e. 22 observations in low, 33 in 
medium and 12 in high trust categories). The alternative hypothesis is that subjects in the higher trust category show 
a higher level reciprocity. 17 
classification according to both criteria. The distributions of returned percentages of each subject 
can be visually observed in figure 9 (see Appendix) according to the classification of table 10. 
uniform increasing decreasing random total
low 10 0 5 7 22
medium 21 2 1 9 33
high 12 0 0 0 12
total 43 2 6 16 67
trust level
distribution of retruned percentages Subjects' types 
according to
 
Table 10: Classification of subjects according to their trust category and their reciprocity profile 
We  test for independence between the two categorical variables reported in table  10.  The 
calculated value of  
2=16.296 can be rejected at the 5% level of significance (p=0.012). We 
therefore  conclude that there  is a significant relation between  a subject‟s trusting type and 
reciprocity
15 type. For instance high trust subjects belong to the uniform reciprocity type.  
7.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  investigated  the  relation  between  trustfulness  and  trustworthiness  within 
individuals by analyzing the amounts sent and amounts returned by the same individual in the 
investment game. Our goal was to provide a more refined test of such a relation than those 
currently available in the existing literature. Previous experiments tried to identify such a link 
mainly on the basis of three methods : the relation between sent and returned amounts when 
subjects play a single role, the relation between the returned amount and the stated own level of 
trust, and the relation between sent and returned amounts by the same individual. While the first 
two methods provide conflicting results across studies, experiments based on within subject data 
suggest a positive relation between the own level of reciprocity and the own level of trust. In 
accordance with the latter findings, our research hypothesis was that more trustful subjects are 
also more trustworthy. 
We implemented the strategy method in order to collect individual data for both roles : sender 
and receiver. While the same method was already used in other experiments on the investment 
game (Glaeser et al. (2000), Ashraf et al. (2006), Chaudhuri & Gangadharan (2007) and Altmann 
et al. (2008)), the originality of our paper lies in our data analysis. We first showed that the 
returned percentage is significantly affected by the responder‟s own level of trust but not by the 
                                                 
15 The Cramer measure calculated from table 10 also shows a medium strength relation between the two variables 
(C=0.35).  We  take  this  as  further  evidence  that  trusting  behaviour  and  trustworthiness  are  correlated  within 
individuals.   
 18 
amount received from their counterparts. We then classified each subject into a trust category 
and a reciprocity category. We next showed that a subject who belongs to a higher reciprocity 
category belongs also to a higher trust category. Our key finding, which allows us to establish a 
correlation  between  trust  categories  and  reciprocity  categories,  is  that  for  most  subjects  the 
returned percentage is independent of the received amount. Furthermore, such a uniform pattern 
of reciprocity behaviour is observed in our three trust categories (low, medium and high).  
Besides our main finding about the correlation between trustfulness and trustworthiness within 
individuals,  our  findings  are  consistent  with  the  findings  of  the  psychological  process  of 
“projection”. Individuals who exhibits projective behaviour attribute their own faults, wishes or 
characteristics  onto  other  persons  (e.g.  McMahon  et  al.,  1982,  Wittig  and  Williams,  1984, 
Fröhlich,  1994).  Straker  (2004)  distinguishes  three  types  of  projection  among  which 
“complementary projection” assumes that others do, think and feel in the same way as oneself. 
 
According to Spear et al. (1988), in unfamiliar situations or when one‟s internal feeling or thought 
contrasts  with  one‟s  perceived  reality  the  psychological  process  of  projection  can  solve  the 
conflict.  In  the  trust  game  such  a  conflict  between  perception  and  self-conception  arises 
whenever the partner‟s trust differs from the own trust. The projective reasoning hypothesis 
suggests that this conflict can be solved if the responder projects his own level of trust onto his 
partner and fits the level of reciprocity to her projected level of trust. In other words, a responder 
with a high level of trust expects that his trusting action will be reciprocated if he were acting as a 
trustor. Since he acts as a responder, the projective reasoning hypothesis predicts that he will 
project his own level of trust onto the sender and will do exactly what he expects from others to 
do unto him. Similarly, a responder with a low level of trust, chooses a low level of reciprocity, 
because he projects his own low level of trust onto the sender and reciprocates at this lower level. 
The projection hypothesis is consistent with our main finding that the percentage returned is 
independent from the amount sent for most subjects.  19 
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A P P E N D I X  
 
gender # mean st. dev.
female 45 4.56 2.53
male 28 5.96 3.02
Total 73 5.10 2.79
academic major # mean st. dev.
economics 2 6.50 4.95
law 14 6.36 2.65
engineering 20 4.95 2.86
human arts 37 4.62 2.67
Total 73 5.10 2.79
without economists 71 5.056338
live with par. # mean st. dev.
no 19 4.89 2.28
yes 54 5.17 2.97
Total 73 5.10 2.79
academic year # mean st. dev.
1 14 3.71 2.33
2 20 4.40 2.54
3 10 5.40 3.03
4 15 5.87 2.59
5 14 6.43 3.06
Total 73 5.10 2.79
age # mean st. dev.
     - 20 23 4.04 2.53
21 - 22 25 5.40 2.71
          23 - 25 5.76 2.93
Total 73 5.10 2.79
pocket money # mean st. dev.
   0 - 5000 36 4.75 2.47
5001 - 10000 24 5.46 3.09
    10001 - 13 5.38 3.18
Total 73 5.10 2.79  
Table 1: Average sent amounts according to demographic variables 
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Figure 6: Distribution and standard deviation of average returned percentages in case of low trust 
subjects 
 
Figure 7: Distribution and standard deviation of average returned percentages in case of medium 
trust subjects 24 
 
Figure 8: Distribution and standard deviation of average returned percentages in case of high 
trust subjects 
The  continuous  blue  line  and  the  red  vertical  bars  represent  the  average  returns  and  the 
corresponding standard deviations of low trust subjects for each possible received amount. The 
dashed green line and the red vertical bars show the same in case of medium trust subjects, while 
the dotted dashed red line with the red vertical bars are for the high trust subjects. 
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